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Abstract
In this paper we study the existence of bubbles for pricing equilibria in a pure exchange
economy à la Lucas, with inﬁnitely lived homogeneous agents. The model is analyzed under
fairly general assumptions: no restrictions either on the stochastic process governing dividends’
distribution or on the utilities (possibly unbounded) are required. We prove that the pricing
equilibrium is unique as long as the agents exhibit uniformly bounded relative risk aversion. A
generic uniqueness result is also given regardless of agent’s preferences. A few ”pathological”
examples of economies exhibiting pricing equilibria with bubble components are constructed.
Finally, a possible relationship between our approach and the theory developed by Santos and
Woodford on ambiguous bubbles is investigated. The whole discussion sheds more insight on the
common belief that bubbles are a marginal phenomenon in such models.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C61, C62, D51, G12.
∗This research was partially supported by M.U.R.S.T. (Italy), National Group on ”Nonlinear Dynamics and Sto-
chastic Models in Economics and Finance” and by NATO-CNR (Italy) under Grant # 217.31. We are grateful to
Tapan Mitra for giving the second author the opportunity to be visiting at the Department of Economics, Cornell
University, while the present research was terminated. We also thank David Easley and all the participants of the
Macro-Workshop, especially Karl Shell and Guido Cozzi, for valuable comments and constructive discussion. We have
also beneﬁciated by insightful comments of two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata, Università di Torino, e ICER (Italy).
E-mail: luigi.montrucchio@econ.unito.it.
‡Dipartimento di Politiche Pubbliche e Scelte Collettive, Università del Piemonte Orientale, e ICER (Italy).
E-mail: fabio.privileggi@unipmn.it.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The main objective of this paper is to test how reasonable is the conjecture that multiple equilibria,
or bubbles1, are a negligible phenomenon in sequential equilibrium models of Lucas-type [15], with
inﬁnitely lived homogeneous agents. While we have not been lucky in proving that optimizing
behavior of a representative agent with smooth preferences is enough to rule out bubbles, regardless
of the random behavior of the economy, in the present work we deﬁnitely provide robust arguments
that conﬁne their appearance to a very restrictive class. This is achieved for a more general model
than the original Lucas’ one, in a framework similar to that developed in [11]. Two important aspects
are implemented. First, no restriction on the probabilistic law of dividends is postulated (a similar
setting can be found in [13] as well, but for diﬀerent purposes). Second, nearly no boundedness
assumption on both dividends and trading prices is assumed, as well as on utilities. The only
hypotheses maintained are the diﬀerentiability of preferences and the zero short-sales constraint.
Surprisingly, until recently the issue of bubbles in such a model has not attracted much atten-
tion. On the other hand, rather few examples of bubbles can be found in the literature. At least
two reasons may explain this ”lack of interest”. First, since all bubble-producing factors are ab-
sent in Lucas-style models, it has been taken for granted that they should emerge only in rather
special circumstances. This view-point is easily captured by consulting the by now wide literature
on intertemporal asset pricing models (see [19], [4], [22], [6], [9], [14], [8], [16], [18], [10]). Per-
haps, this intuition suggested that economies such that the equilibrium allocation is given by the
initial resources deserved no further investigation, thus addressing more attention toward analyzing
equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents as well as with various debt constraints.
A second reason for the scarce interest in studying price bubbles in Lucas-type models is perhaps
due to the well known analytical diﬃculties in formulating some necessary condition of transversality
at inﬁnity (see Ekeland and Scheinkman [7] and Kamihigashi [12]). Results available in the literature
show that this is a hard task in the stochastic setting, unless severe restrictions are imposed (see [24]
and [21]).
1We are aware that the terminology here adopted may give rise to misinterpretations. Our model is a peculiar case
in which the assets fundamental value is unambiguously deﬁned, and thus bubble existence turns out to be equivalent
to price indeterminacy. By slightly relaxing some assumptions (e.g. separability or diﬀerentiability of preferences), or
by considering heterogeneity of individuals, indeterminacy and bubbles immediately get unrelated. For example, in
[23] an economy is constructed such that the unique equilibrium is supported by positively priced ﬁat-money. We shall
turn on the distinction between multiple equilibria and bubbles at the end.
2Two recent papers stimulated the present research. Santos and Woodford [18] established general
results on rational bubbles within a quite broad scenario of sequential equilibrium economies where
traders have rational expectations. They proved that perpetual assets in non-zero net supply cannot
give rise to unambiguous price bubbles and, in addition, to any sort of bubbles whenever prefer-
ences satisfy a certain property of discounting. However, it is important to stress that Santos and
Woodford’s analysis rests on the simpliﬁed assumption that the underlying stochastic environment
has a tree structure with ﬁnitely many information sets at each instant of time. This allows them
to provide an elegant theory of asset pricing which extends to an inﬁnite-horizon dynamic context
Kreps’ arbitrage approach. Besides this, it is very important to remark that their analysis is some-
what diﬀerent than ours: they are concerned with the issue of whether a given equilibrium involves
a bubble component. Indeed, a natural consequence of dynamical incompleteness of markets is that
the present value of the streams of future dividends is not uniquely determined, causing several
complications and additional types of bubbles (the so-called ambiguous bubbles). We discuss some
of these aspects that are in common with our results in Section 5.
The second paper, due to Kamihigashi [11], resembles closely our approach. To further strengthen
the broadly accepted idea of marginality of bubbles, he provides a condition that assures the unique-
ness of equilibrium not properly related to discounting properties of agent’s preferences. To construct
an example of multiple equilibria in a two-period economy where there are countably many states
of the world, he needs to use a consumer’s utility function that is unbounded. Moreover, he makes
an important remark by observing that the presence of positive bubbles in his example is related to
the violation of the Euler equation.
Owing to the generality of our setting, we must ﬁrst study carefully the consistency of the model,
in order to formulate suitable necessary and suﬃcient conditions for price equilibria to exist such
that they include the fundamental values of assets. This is pursued in Section 2 where we show that
the standard Euler equation is not necessary to construct the classical theory of assets equilibrium
valuation. In place of the stochastic Euler equation, we shall utilize an Euler inequality as an
optimality necessary condition. It is soon realized that the imposition of the Euler equations is not
fully justiﬁed and may preclude potential bubbles.
Section 3, where the main results of this paper are given, is devoted to make precise the notion
of ”fragility” for potential multiple equilibria. We establish a result (Theorem 3) that character-
izes potential price indeterminacy precisely as a borderline phenomenon: a slight modiﬁcation of
the amounts of assets, or that of dividends, has the eﬀect that multiple equilibria disappear. To
3strengthen our argument, we then show that all preferences exhibiting uniformly bounded relative
risk aversion fall outside the class of models having bubbles (Theorem 4).
It is natural, after having outlined multiplicity of equilibria as a possible outcome only in a non-
generic set of economies, to devote our attention to the study of this ”tiny” category. We are able to
provide a rough classiﬁcation of bubbles into two categories. All this is argued in Section 4 where we
construct two polar examples of bubbles. It turns out that agent’s unbounded relative risk-aversion
is the key ingredient in their construction.
Finally, Section 5 is dedicated to the already mentioned issue of ambiguous bubbles introduced
by Santos and Woodford [18]. Two assumptions ruling out ambiguous bubbles and their connection
with the theory developed in the previous sections are investigated. The ﬁrst one generalizes an
assumption on agent’s impatience already studied in [18]. The second one is a transversality condition
at inﬁnity that turns out to be suﬃcient for non-existence of ambiguous bubbles. Their relation with
Kamihigashi [11] uniqueness condition is discussed.
Most of the proofs are gathered in the ﬁnal Appendix.
2 The Set-up
Let us formalize the model that closely follows [15]. There are k productive assets, each in ﬁxed
supply, that produce random quantities of a single perishable consumption good in all time periods.
Consumers are identical in terms of preferences and endowments. At each trading time there are spot
markets both for the consumption good and for shares in the assets. The uncertainty is modelled
by a probability space (Ω,F,µ) where F = {F0 ⊂ F1 ⊂ F2 ⊂ ··· ⊂ F} is a ﬁltration of σ-algebras
describing the revelation of information. The asset dividends d =
©
dt (ω) ∈ Rk
+,t =0 ,1,2,...}
form an F-adapted process which represents the amount of the consumption good yielded by one
unit of each single asset. The process w = {wt(ω)} is the non-negative F-adapted process of exoge-
nous endowments of the consumption good. We shall denote by Et (·) the conditional expectation2
E(·|F t).





2In general, the initial σ-algebra F0 may not be the trivial one and thus the operator E0 does not agree necessarily
with the expectation E. This is not a merely empty generalization. It enables us to treat time t homogeneously. Every
result obtained for t =0is immediately translated to any epoch t.
4deﬁned over the consumption processes c ={ct(ω)}. Each instantaneous utility ut is not necessarily
uniform across states and the above series needs not be convergent. A process of assets holding
strategy is denoted by y ={yt(ω)}. The initial endowment of each asset is normalized to one, i.e.,
y0 =e=( 1,1,...,1) ∈ Rk.
Here are the main assumptions to be eﬀective throughout this paper. Even where it is not
explicitly speciﬁed, properties pertaining all the functions involved must hold almost surely with
respect to the measure µ. For vectors notation, a superscript will denote its component. For instance,
di
t(ω) is the dividend payed by asset i,a te p o c ht when the state of the world is ω.
A. 1 0 <d t(ω) · e+wt (ω)=
Pk
i=1 di
t(ω)+wt (ω) < +∞ a.s. for all t.
A. 2 For each t, utilities ut (·,·) are B1 ⊗ Ft-measurable, where B1 is the Borel σ-algebra in R+,
and, ut (·,ω) are concave, strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable over R++,f o re a c hﬁxed ω.
A.1 could be relaxed by admitting the total good supply dt · e+wt to vanish with positive
probability. However this requires the marginal utility to be ﬁnite at zero, thus generating some
further formal complications. Needless to say, Assumption A.2 encompasses standard unbounded
utilities, like logarithm, having ut (0,ω)=−∞ with positive probability, as well as functions having
inﬁnite derivative at zero.
Ac o n t i n g e n tp l a n(c,y)={ct (ω),y t(ω)}, t ≥ 0,i ss a i dt ob ef e a s i b l ei f :
i) ct (ω) ≥ 0 are Ft-measurable variables for all t ≥ 0;
ii) yt(ω) ≥ 0 are Ft−1-measurable for t ≥ 1 and y0 =e=( 1,1,...,1);
iii) ct (ω)+pt(ω) · [yt+1 (ω) − yt(ω)] ≤ dt(ω) · yt (ω)+wt(ω) a.s. for t ≥ 0.
Below we give the deﬁnition of Arrow-Radner sequential equilibrium, where Brock’s [3] concept
of weak maximality is adopted. To ease notation, from now on we will drop the argument ω of all
the random functions under study. By abusing a bit notation, we shall also write ut (ct) instead
of ut (ct (ω),ω) and the derivative D1ut (c,ω) will be denoted by u0
t (c).S y m b o l s X− and X+ will
denote the negative and the positive part of a random variable X, respectively. We also recall that,
for non-negative random vectors Y (ω) ∈ Rk, the notation Et (Y ) < +∞ means Et (|Y |) < +∞ or,
equivalently, Et (Y · e) < +∞.F o r a m e a s u r a b l e s e t A ∈ F, the indicator function of A will be
denoted by 1A.
5Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is an F-adapted price process p such that:
i) 0 ≤ pt < +∞ a.s. for all t;
and the plan c∗ = {c∗
t} = {dt · e+wt}, y∗ = {e} satisﬁes the two conditions:
ii) E0 [ut(c∗
t) − ut(ct)]




t) − ut(ct)] ≥ 0 a.s.
for any feasible plan (c,y) where the yt’s are essentially bounded, for each t ≥ 1.
Here we are given the standard notion of no-trade equilibrium in which agents hold their assets
forever, and consume all their available income dt · e+wt at each trading date. The framework
adopted here is similar to that in [11], where a discounted, single-asset model has been analyzed.
We want to remark that the restriction concerning boundedness of the yt’s is needed for technical
reasons. It will only be eﬀective whenever suﬃcient conditions of optimality are used (see proof of
Theorem 1). It will also be seen that, at least for the fundamental prices, the plan c∗ satisﬁes the
stronger property of optimality liminfN→+∞ E0
PN−1
t=0 [ut(c∗
t) − ut(ct)] ≥ 0. Henceforth, we shall
always write {c∗
t} to denote the equilibrium consumption allocation c∗={dt · e+wt}.
In the remaining part of this section, we build up the equilibrium analysis for our general frame-
work. Though the whole discussion on the determination of pricing equilibrium as sum of its funda-
mental value and the speculative bubble is familiar in macroeconomics and ﬁnance (see Blanchard
and Fischer [2]), we believe it is worth being reported here owing to the generality of our setting
and the stress we shall put on a supermartingale property that turns out to characterize the bubble
component. It is important remarking that we do not restrict prices to belong to some pre-chosen
space as well as we maintain the weak notion of optimality. Both restrictions on prices or the use of
stronger concepts of optimality might rule out possible pricing bubbles.
The starting point is formula (1) below, which turns out to be a short-run ﬁrst-order condition,
that takes the form of an Euler inequality rather than equality.
















for t ≥ 1.
6One could ask in what cases equality in (1) is necessarily true. This requires to perform the
left-hand derivative in the proof of this proposition. That is problematic insofar, once again, ap r i o r i
restrictions on prices pt are needed. It is not diﬃcult to show that (1) holds with equality if the
following two qualiﬁcations are satisﬁed:
pt · e ≤ Mtc∗
t (2)
for some scalar Mt,a n d
Et−1 [ut (c∗
t) − ut (ζdt · e+wt)] < +∞ (3)
for some ζ < 1. For instance, either conditions are true when the states of the world are ﬁnite at
trading date t. We shall also see later that a suﬃcient requirement for (3) is that ut exhibits bounded
relative risk-aversion.
Inequality (1) will be enough to build up pricing analysis within our general setting. As usual,
























































t)pt < +∞,b y( i)o fD e ﬁnition 1, and the last term is non-negative, we infer both
conditions (5) and (6) displayed in the following proposition.























for all t ≥ 0.


















7where the ”bubble” component bt (ω) ∈ Rk
+ is Ft-measurable. Accordingly, we deﬁne the market


















Thanks to (7), if p is an equilibrium, then p = f + b,w i t hb = {bt}.W eh a v eh e r et h et r a d i t i o n a l
deﬁnition of speculative bubble as the diﬀerence between the price of the asset and its fundamental































We obtain, in our general setting, the property that a bubble ”never starts” in the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium (see [18]) but, as will be seen in Section 4, the possibility for a bubble component
to exist and burst as time goes on, cannot be excluded.
It is interesting to sketch prices evolution according to the standard Euler equation, i.e., as long




























































Clearly, in such a case the bubble component, if it exists, can never burst.
Next statement establishes fundamental values f to be an equilibrium, thus ensuring the suﬃ-
ciency of (5) as well. This kind of results are usually proven by means of familiar suﬃcient conditions
of transversality. Nonetheless, owing to the special nature of constraints, we prefer resorting to a
more direct method. Details are reported in the Appendix. It should be noted that we do not assume




t)wt to be ﬁnite.
8Theorem 1 Under A.1-2 and the additional condition E0 [u0
t (c∗
t)wt] < ∞ for all t ≥ 0, a necessary







t)dt < +∞. (11)


















3M a i n R e s u l t s
In this section we present results ruling out the emergence of multiple equilibria. The ﬁrst suﬃcient
criterion has been established by Kamihigashi [11]. Its proof reﬂects the intuition that, if a bubble
occurred, an inﬁnitely lived consumer could gain by permanently reducing his holding of the asset.
To be more speciﬁc, it allows for a uniform downward perturbation within the feasible set without
facing an inﬁnite loss.
Theorem 2 As u ﬃcient condition for the fundamental price f given in (8) to be the unique equilib-




[ut (dt · e+wt) − ut (ζdt · e+wt)] < +∞ (12)
To illustrate the strength of (12), consider the standard case in which the utilities are discounted,
i.e., ut (c)=βtu(c). If the preference function u is bounded, then (12) is trivially true. Therefore,
possible violation to (12) requires u to be unbounded. We refer to [11] (Theorem 5.1) for several
assumptions on u(c) guaranteeing qualiﬁcation (12).
The following criterion will play a central role in proving Theorems 3 and 4.






t (ζdt · e+wt)dt < +∞ (13)
for some scalar 0 < ζ < 1.
This corollary is an immediate consequence of concavity of ut’s that entails
ut (dt · e+wt) − ut (ζdt · e+wt) ≤ (1 − ζ)u
0
t (ζdt · e+wt)dt · e
9and thus (13) implies (12).
It is worth also noticing that, again in force of concavity,




which reveals (12) to be suﬃcient for (11). Therefore, Kamihigashi’s criterion implies existence and
uniqueness simultaneously.
A slight modiﬁcation of the proof of Theorem 2 establishes a further speciﬁcation of (12) focussing
on a single asset i and upon the occurrence of some event A ∈ Fs.














for some scalar 0 < ζ < 1, then the bubble component, for the ith component pi
t, vanishes after epoch
s,a sl o n ga sA occurs. That is, bi
t (ω)=0 ,f o rt ≥ s and almost all ω ∈ A.
A remarkable consequence of Proposition 3 is the absence of a positive bubble component for ﬁat
money assets, i.e.,a s s e t sf o rw h i c hdi
t(ω) ≡ 0 for all t. In fact, in such a case, (14) is trivially true,
irrespectively of agent’s preferences. This extends Corollary 3.2 in [18] to our setting.
The intuition behind next fragility result rests behind the evident similarity between necessary
condition for existence of at least one equilibrium (11) and suﬃcient condition for uniqueness (13).
The idea of fragility can be easily grasped through two parallel arguments: consider the economy
parametrized either on the initial assets endowment y0 =eor on the dividend stream d = {dt},t h e n
any slight perturbation of the parameter forces a possible bubble to disappear.
Theorem 3 If a price bubble occurs for an initial endowment y0 =v∈ Rk
++, then there is only
one equilibrium for each initial endowment v À v, while there are no equilibria at all for each
endowment v ¿ v. Likewise, if for some dividend sequence d = {dt} a bubble arises, then there is
only one equilibrium for dividends {ζdt},w i t hζ > 1, and there are no equilibria if ζ < 1.
This theorem amounts to saying that uniqueness and non-existence of equilibrium are the sole
robust conﬁgurations, while bubbles are a borderline phenomenon that may only arise when the set
of equilibria is about to become empty. To further illustrate this point, let us focus on economies
parametrized with respect to dividends {ζdt},w h e r eζ ∈ (0,∞). For sake of simplicity, assume k = 1





t (ζdt + wt)dt
which turns out to be non-increasing and right-continuous. If J (ζ) < +∞ for all ζ,t h e r ei sa l w a y s
uniqueness. Likewise, J (ζ)=+ ∞ for all ζ, implies no equilibria. Therefore, the only interesting case
happens when there is a jump from +∞ to a ﬁn i t ev a l u ea ts o m e( u n i q u e )c r i t i c a ll e v e lζb,w h i c hi s
t h eu n i q u ep a r a m e t e rv a l u es u c ht h a tb u b b l e sm a ya r i s e .N o t ea l s ot h a t ,a sl o n ga sJ (ζb)=+ ∞,a
sudden change through the two stable conﬁgurations is witnessed and no bubble can occur. However,
the existence of a threshold ζb,s u c ht h a tJ (ζb) < +∞ (i.e. such that (13) fails), is not enough to
generate a bubble: (12) must be violated as well.
We have not been able to single out classes of models assuring the existence of bubbles along this
argument. For instance, the two-period economies studied in Example 1 of the next section enjoy
this property, but other examples analyzed in [17] lead to diﬀerent outcomes. On the other hand, an
important class where condition (12) is not necessary at all has to be mentioned: in the deterministic
model bubbles can never arise, regardless of (12). This case will be brieﬂy recovered in Section 5.
Let us end this section by presenting another strong argument in favor of bubble fragility. Unlike
Theorem 3, formulated without resorting to any speciﬁcation of agent’s preferences, next statement
is related to agent’s risk aversion. We give a suﬃcient condition for (13) in the spirit of assumptions
(L2) and (U2) in [11] that implies to be J (ζb)=+ ∞ for the critical value (if any).









for all c ≥ 0, t ≥ 0 and for some scalar R. Then pricing equilibrium is uniquely determined, whenever
it exists3.
Note that this result encompasses almost all agent preferences in conceivable economic models.
4 Bubbles Examples
All the criteria formulated in the previous section are only suﬃcient conditions, hence, it is not clear
at this stage whether or not examples of economies in which equilibrium valuations contain positive
bubbles actually exist. Theorems 3 and 4 make clear that their construction is not a simple matter.
3It must be emphasized that twice diﬀerentiability hypothesis on preferences is not necessary at all. It is suﬃcient
that some R exists such that u
0
t(c,ω)c
R are nondecreasing for all t and for a.e. ω.
11In view of Theorem 2, the ﬁrst step in trying to construct bubbles is the following rough classiﬁ-
cation distinguishing two polar cases in which suﬃcient criterion (12) is violated.





t) − ut(ζdt · e+wt)] = +∞





t) − ut(ζdt · e+wt)] < +∞.





t) − ut(ζdt · e+wt)] = +∞
with positive probability.
By virtue of Proposition 3, economies falling into the ﬁrst category, exhibit prices having bt =0
for t ≥ N −1, and therefore bubbles, if any, must eventually burst after some time. Not surprisingly,
it turns out that their occurrence is related to the violation of the Euler equation. Models with
bubble component belonging to the second class, seem less dependent on violation of Euler equality,
as it will emerge clearly in Example 2 below.
Despite of a somewhat common view-point, we show that bubbles do occur, that is, the borderline
set described in Theorem 3 may be non-empty. An example of bubbles of the ﬁrst type has already
been given by [11]. Here, we propose a general construction.
Example 1 Let (Ω,F,µ) be a probability space modelling the world states. The uncertainty is
completely revealed at time t = 1. Therefore, F0 = {∅,Ω},a n dFt = F for t ≥ 1. The dividends of
a single asset are d0 > 0, d1 (ω) > 0 and dt (ω)=0for t ≥ 2.E n d o w m e n t s a r e w0 = w1 =0and
wt = w>0 for t ≥ 2. Agent’s preferences are given by ut = βtv(c). Regarding to the utility v,i ti s
assumed to satisfy the two requirements
E[v0(d1)d1] < +∞
E[v(d1) − v(ζd1)] = +∞
(16)









and ft (ω)=0 for t>0.
12Clearly, a consequence of Proposition 3 is that no bubbles can arise for t ≥ 1.
We show the existence of a positive bubble component at t =0 .S i n c ept = ft =0for t ≥ 1,i fw e
set y1 = 1 + δ, consumptions are c0 = d0 − p0δ, c1 =( 1 + δ)d1, ct = w,f o rt ≥ 2.B ye v a l u a t i n gt h e
objective function over this consumption plan, it is immediate to see that p0 will be an equilibrium
if the convex function
ϕ(δ)=v(d0) − v(d0 − p0δ)+βE[v(d1) − v((1 + δ)d1)]
deﬁned over the interval −1 ≤ δ <d 0/p0,a c h i e v e si t sm i n i m u ma tδ =0 . In view of (16), ϕ(δ)=+ ∞
if δ < 0 and ϕ(0) = 0. Thanks to convexity, the optimum lies at zero whenever ϕ
0
+(0) ≥ 0.S i m p l e








≥ 0, which amounts to p0 ≥ f0.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
any price p0 ≥ f0 is an equilibrium and the Euler equation is violated when p0 >f 0.O b s e r v et h a t
here the violation of the Euler equation is due the failure of (3), while (2) remains true.
To complete this example, we need to specify functions v satisfying both conditions in (16). Set
Ω = {1,2,.....} and F =2 Ω. In view of Theorem 4, a good candidate turns out to be v(c)=−e
1
c,
exhibiting unbounded relative risk aversion close to the origin. Let d1 (n)=n−1 be the dividend




















where the series converges since ennµn is asymptotically equivalent to n−(1+α). Regarding to the
second one of (16), observe that






















which go to inﬁnity as n →∞ ,a n ds oE [v(d1) − v(ζd1)] = +∞.
Obviously, this bubble is not robust at all. To test its fragility, set the dividend to be d1 (n)=
ζn−1. Then the fundamental values are the unique equilibrium for ζ > 1, while, there are no
equilibria if ζ < 1,s i n c et h eﬁrst of (16) fails.
13It should be noted that the assumption of having inﬁnitely many observable states at time t = 1
becomes crucial in order to violate the Euler equation. Since Example 1 represents essentially a
two-period economy, here the ”inﬁnity” feature of the economy is spread along states over a single
period. On the contrary, next example features the existence of second-kind bubbles by means of
a truly inﬁnite-horizon economy with ﬁnitely many information nodes at every trading date. As a
consequence, Euler equation can never be violated. In this circumstances, multiple equilibria may
arise by modeling agents having increasing relative risk-aversion over time.
Example 2 (Bubbles and Petersburg assets) Let Ω = {1,2,...} and the σ-algebra Ft be generated
by the ﬁnite partition {1}, {2}, ..., {t}, {t + 1, t +2 , ...}. I fw es e tt h ed i v i d e n d so fas i n g l e
perpetual asset to be dt (ω) > 0 for ω = t and dt (ω)=0otherwise, it is easy to realize that for any
equilibrium one has pt (ω)=0for all ω ≤ t,w h i l ept (ω) > 0 for ω ≥ t + 1, no matter whatever
preferences and exogenous resources are given.
Given that the informational structure is ﬁnite at any trading date, it is simpler to describe it by
means of an event-date tree. Among the t+1 information sets of Ft,w el a b e lst = {t + 1,t+2 ,....}
and mt = {t}. The remaining nodes will be little relevant and thus we do not assign them any
particular symbol. With this notation at hand, all nodes st have two immediate successors st+1 and




> 0 and d(·)=0elsewhere, while p
¡
st¢
> 0 and p(·)=0elsewhere. We now specialize



















= βtc with 0 < β < 1.C l e a r l y ,
preferences display unbounded relative risk aversion along states mt since vt’s relative risk-aversion
index equals t + 1. The dividends payed by the asset are d
¡
mt¢
= 1, for all t ≥ 1,a n d0 elsewhere.
At each date t,t h ee n d o w m e n t sa r ew
¡
mt¢
=0and w(·)=w>0 at each other node.

























t+s (1)+ l i m
n→∞2−nβnpt+n
where the ﬁrst addendum is its fundamental value and the second is the bubble component. Note









and the bubble component obeys the martingale law bt+1 =2 β−1bt.
Next proposition states formally that such trading prices with positive bubble component are
consistent with equilibrium requirements.
Proposition 4 All prices pt = ft + bt with bubble component growing along states st according to
the diﬀerence equation bt+1 =2 β−1bt,w i t hb0 ≥ 0,a r ee q u i l i b r i a .
The structure of this event-date tree resembles the Petersburg game and it could slightly be
modiﬁed to get several more elaborated examples. Note, for instance, that here the bubble component
will burst with probability 1 (although it grows exponentially). However, it is not diﬃcult to modify
the probability law over Ω so that the bubble does not burst with positive probability. In the
original working paper version of this article [17], we derive another example of Petersburg asset,
having countably many nodes at every date, that exhibits a bubble due to the continuous violation of
the Euler equation at each trading date. This conﬁrms our intuition on pursuing an Euler inequality
rather than equality to develop the equilibrium theory of Section 2.
5A m b i g u o u s B u b b l e s
It is well known from the ﬁnite-horizon theory that state-prices can be determined by non-existence
of opportunities for pure intertemporal arbitrage proﬁts. In our general probabilistic structure, this
can be taken into account by conveniently adopting the following terminology. Given an equilibrium
price process p, an adapted sequence at (ω) of strictly positive functions will be termed a (pseudo)
state-prices consistent with p,i f
atpt = Et [at+1 (pt+1 + dt+1)] (19)
15holds for all t ≥ 0. Strictly speaking, the at’s are not the traditional state-prices of Finance, because
they are distorted by the probability law. However, there is a one-to-one correspondence with state
prices, as long as the stochastic process is given through ﬁnite information nodes. In fact, in this

























is the transition probability and st, st+1 are adjacent nodes (we are using here
the notation in [18]). After multiplying by µ
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st¢






























state-prices. Clearly, formulation (19) suits better when the states are not necessarily ﬁnite.
The theory developed Section 2 can be easily embedded into this approach that uses (19). For







which might generate a diﬀerent splitting between the fundamental solution and the bubble compo-
nent, with respect to the classical decomposition discussed in Section 2.
According to [18], a pricing equilibrium p (possibly the unique one) is said ambiguously to in-
volve a speculative bubble if one has limt→∞ E0 [atpt]=0for some state-price process at,w h i l e
limt→∞ E0 [a0
tpt] > 0 for some other process a0
t. On the contrary, an equilibrium p involves unam-
biguously no bubble, provided that limt→∞ E0 [atpt]=0holds regardless of state-price processes at
which are chosen.
As a matter of fact, the only example in [18] of bubbles for Lucas’ models (Example 4.5) is an
economy exhibiting an ambiguous bubble, as the bubble component depends crucially on diﬀerent
state-prices adopted. To see why this sort of bubble must be considered outside the theory discussed
in the previous sections, it suﬃces observing that the equilibrium so constructed is unique and (12)
is fulﬁlled. Example 3 presented later will display similar features (another example generalizing the
binomial tree of [18] is reported in [17]).
In the following we investigate the relationship between Kamihigashi’s condition (12) and other
two criteria that exclude the occurrence of ambiguous bubbles. We treat separately each single asset
and, since its price may vanish with positive probability, we make use of the following notation. For






b et h ez e r o - p r i c ee v e n tb e l o n g i n gt o
Ft. Clearly, from (19), it turns out that Pi
t ⊂ Pi
t+1.
The ﬁrst assumption is related to agent’s preferences.









¢c, there exists a scalar ζ = ζ (s,A),
with 0 < ζ < σ−1
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t, for 0 ≤ t ≤ s − 1,
c∗
t + ζdi
t, for t = s,
c∗
t − ζσsdi
t, for t ≥ s + 1
overtakes c∗ over A.T h a ti s :
liminfN→+∞ E0
PN−1




t=0 1A [ut (e ct) − ut (c∗
t)] > 0.
The second assumption does not rely on preferences, but it is directly constructed along a given
equilibrium.














t =+ ∞ over Pi
t).
A few comments are in order. A.3 is closely related to the assumption A.2 on agent’s impatience
postulated by Santos and Woodford [18] as well as the uniform lower bound on impatience assumption
in Magill and Quinzii [16]. Indeed Theorem 3.3 in [18] on non-occurrence of bubbles, regardless of
the state prices chosen, basically rests on their assumption on impatience. Note that our A.3 is
considerably weaker that theirs. A.4 is a transversality condition at inﬁnity related to the exclusion
of rolling-over debts in Ponzi strategies. It is also linked to Cass’ eﬃcient condition (see [5]): in the
17deterministic setting (21) amounts to saying that the equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient. However,
this is no longer true in the stochastic framework4.
Let us establish at once the relationship between these two diﬀerent assumptions and (12).
Proposition 5 A.3 =⇒ (12). A.3 =⇒ A.4.
Caution is needed to interpret these implications. A.3 is a property on the preferences, while A.4
is a transversality hypothesis on one single equilibrium. Implication A.3 =⇒ A.4 means that all the
price equilibria will satisfy that transversality condition, provided A.3 is true. The proof of this part
is given in the Appendix. The ﬁrst implication deserves explanation as well. From (i)o fA . 3 ,s o m e
























where the last inequality is true in force of (ii)o fD e ﬁnition 1. Therefore, (14), which is a speciﬁcation
of (12), is valid at least for t ≥ N + 1.
Next statement is our main result on non-existence of ambiguous bubbles.
Theorem 5 If a pricing equilibrium p satisﬁes A.4, then pi
t unambiguously involve no bubble.
It is worth observing that A.3, while more restrictive than (12), guarantees our desired property
of non-existence of ambiguous bubbles. On the contrary, next example shows that (12) does not
guarantee this property. Furthermore, it also shows that, despite of having (a bit improperly) labelled
A.3 as a condition on impatience, as a matter of fact it involves a more complicated interplay between
the discounting and the nature of dividend process.
Example 3 (Petersburg asset and ambiguous bubbles) The asset structure is similar to that of
Example 2. Ω = {1,2,...} and Ft are generated by the ﬁnite set partition {1}, {2},..., {t},
{t + 1,t+2 ,...}.L e tµ(n) > 0, for all n, be an assigned probability over Ω. Once again, the
dividends of a single asset be dt(ω) > 0 for ω = t and dt (ω)=0 . We know that for any pricing
equilibrium one has pt (ω)=0for all ω ≤ t,w h i l ept(ω) > 0 for ω ≥ t+1, irrespectively of preferences
and exogenous resources.
4We are indebted to an anonymous referee to have drawn our attention on this interpretation. See also [17] for
further qualiﬁcations.













for all N>0, and consequently A.4 fails. Therefore, in view of Proposition 5, A.3 fails as well.
Note that this price process could well be the unique equilibrium determined by one agent having
preferences satisfying (12). Now we show that there is always a valuation bubble in this class of
economies.
To see this is convenient to adopt the tree notation of Example 2. With the notation st =







































































which proves the existence of a positive bubble along the states st. Clearly this bubble is ambiguous
since it disappears by setting ∆ =0 . In this circumstance, the prices equal the fundamental values
according to a certain state-price process (of course, this last assertion is also a consequence of
Theorem 3.1 in [18]).
A few words on the context where the various assumptions discussed in this section can be used
are needed. Actually, they play signiﬁcantly diﬀerent roles. The state-price approach addresses more
general intertemporal pricing models than the one examined in the previous sections. Preferences
must not necessarily be time-separable and diﬀerentiable. Moreover, the method (Theorem 5 in
particular) applies also to heterogeneous agents models. To stay inside our original focus, it must
be assumed that the set of state-prices contains the process at = u0
t(c∗
t) (namely, the Euler equation
must hold). Under this hypothesis, any price equilibrium p with respect to some state-price that
satisﬁes A.4 is the market fundamental value which unambiguously involves no bubble. On the
19other hand, whenever A.3 holds there is a unique price equilibrium which does not contain a bubble
component regardless of the chosen state-price process.
Let us conclude with a simple but interesting application of the discussion above: the assets
pricing in deterministic sequential markets. As already mentioned, assumption A.4 boils down to
the condition of eﬃciency. Hence, A.4 must hold true along any price equilibrium. Consequently,
Theorem 5 implies that no ambiguous bubble may arise with no uncertainty. We give a formal
statement of this since it is a straightforward and meaningful consequence of the approach based
on A.4. Moreover, our statement is slightly more general than other results available in literature.
It could be derived from Theorem 3.1 in [18] and from Theorem 6.1 in [10] as well, though both
require the present value of the aggregate endowment to be ﬁnite, an assumption not required in our
statement.
Proposition 6 Any price sequential equilibrium in markets without uncertainty satisﬁes A.4 and
therefore Theorem 5 applies.
The last result clearly implies uniqueness of price equilibrium in the diﬀerentiable case. As long
as non-diﬀerentiability is assumed, like in Gilles-LeRoy example (see [9], [11] and [17]), equilibrium
indeterminacy is possible, with no bubbles involved. As said at the beginning, this is one case where
the two concepts, bubbles and multiple equilibria, get totally unrelated.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Is the issue of price bubbles in intertemporal capital asset pricing models with one representative
agent basically closed? The answer is yes, as long as one follows the traditional valuation by means of
fundamental value. We have indeed added further strong arguments in favor of fragility of occurrence
of bubbles. Of course, some theoretical issues remain still open and interesting enough to deserve
further investigation. One of them is the identiﬁcation of classes of models in which suﬃcient criterion
(12) turns out to be necessary as well. In view of Theorem 3, this would allow a characterization for
models with a unique equilibrium for ζ > 1, no equilibria for ζ < 1 and an equilibrium involving some
bubble component for ζ = 1. Actually, some examples studied in [17] tell us that formal elaborations
in this direction are a diﬃcult task.
As long as one tries to encompass the theory developed by Santos and Woodford [18] into this
point of view, several technical diﬃculties arise. Their Theorem 3.1 on non-existence of unambiguous
20bubbles must deﬁnitely be regarded as one of the main contributions on bubbles fragility, and we
d on o tk n o wt ow h a te x t e n ti tc o u l db em o d i ﬁed to ﬁt our setting. The roots of our treatment
rest upon the asymptotic behavior of series (21) which is closely related to the exclusion of Ponzi
schemes. Up to our knowledge, such an approach seems novel and this series happens to exhibit a
strong relationship with the exclusion of valuation bubbles, as established in Theorem 5.
Let us add some more comments on the construction of bubbles. As it has been argued in Section
4, the occurrence of bubbles seems to be another form of paradox related to the economics of inﬁnity
(some kind of paradoxes has well been described in Shell [20]). Roughly speaking, we have met two
paradoxes of inﬁnity.
The ﬁrst one, the milder one, arises when an inﬁnite number of states of the world is observable,
at least at some trading date. The traditional ﬁrst order condition (Euler equation), valid for a
uniformly interior equilibrium, is no longer necessarily true. This has led to the construction of the
so-called bursting bubbles that violate the Euler equation (Example 1). It must be underlined that
this kind of bubbles is not related to the inﬁnite-horizon setting. They do survive in ﬁnite-horizon
economies (Kamihigashi’s example is just performed for a two-period economy). It should also be
noted that the violation of the Euler equation here has nothing to do with the violation of the Euler
equations in heterogeneous agents models with debts constraints. We have in mind Bewley’s [1]
consumption smoothing example with positively valued ﬁat money (see [14] and [18]). There, it is
not possible to uniformly perturb downward the equilibrium trading plan, because the borrowing
constraint is binding and, consequently, the failure of the Euler equation is the rule.
T h es e c o n dt y p eo fb u b b l e sr e q u i r e sat r u l yi n ﬁnite-horizon economy (Example 2). In this case
no violation of the Euler equation is required. The paradox of inﬁnity here is originated by violating
the already cited principle asserting that whenever a bubble occurred, an inﬁnitely lived agent might
gain by permanently reducing the asset holding. For instance, if the agent has increasing relative
risk-aversion through time5, this rule may be no longer true.
7 Appendix
The short-run optimality conditions stated in Proposition 1 require a preliminary lemma.
5Note also that the focus on risk-aversion in our model has a respectable antecedent in Lucas’ paper, where the
relation between asset prices elasticity and relative risk aversion is pointed out.
















· y ≥ 0 (22)
for all t ≥ 1 and for all random vectors y(ω) ≥ 0, Ft−1-measurable, essentially bounded and such
that pt−1 · y ≤ γc∗
t−1,f o rs o m en u m b e rγ > 0, depending on y.






− ut−1 (ct−1)+Et−1 [ut (c∗
t) − ut (ct)]
for 0 ≤ ε ≤ ε0, with ε0 small enough and where
yt =e+εy
ct−1 = c∗
t−1 − εpt−1 · y
ct = c∗
t + ε(pt + dt) · y
By construction, yt > 0, ct > 0 and in force of (ii), ct−1 > 0 as long as ε < γ−1.C l e a r l yJ (0) = 0.I t
is readily seen that such perturbation must leave the agent worse-oﬀ. Therefore, it must be J (ε) ≥ 0.
Moreover, J (ε) is well deﬁned because J (ε) < +∞;t h i si st r u ea sct ≥ c∗
t and thus ut(c∗
t)−ut(ct) ≤ 0.
T a k ead e c r e a s i n gs e q u e n c eεn → 0 and consider the sequence ε−1
n [J (εn) − J (0)] ≥ 0.T h e l i m i t
J
0
+ (0) must be non-negative, provided it does exist. It is immediately seen that
J
0












t)(pt + dt) · y
i
where the second addendum holds by the monotone convergence theorem, since the functions ε−1
n [ut (c∗
t) − ut(ct)]
0 converge to u
0
t (c∗
t)(pt + dt)·y decreasingly in force of concavity of ut.F r o mJ
0
+ (0) ≥ 0, (22) follows.
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix an integer n and deﬁne the event An = {ω : |pt−1 (ω)| ≤ n
and c∗
t−1(ω) ≥ n−1ª
∈ Ft−1.A s n →∞ , An ↑ Ω \ N,w h e r eµ(N)=0 . Consider the function
y(ω)=1Anv,w h e r ev ∈ Rk
+ is any ﬁxed vector. This Ft−1-measurable function meets assumptions

















· v ≥ 0.















22for all ω ∈ An.A sn goes to inﬁnity, it is true almost surely and this completes the proof.







< +∞ for any price sequence satisfying (1),















< +∞ for s ≥ 0,a sw e l l .
Let (ct,y t) be any feasible consumption-portfolio plan for a price process satisfying (1). Multiplying
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tdt · yt + u
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is ﬁnite, as yt+1 is assumed to be




























0p0 · (e − y1)+u
0
0d0 · e+u0




















that is true for all N, for any feasible consumption sequence and where b0 is the price bubble at
epoch 0. To conclude, from the concavity property ut (c∗
















t − ct) ≥− u
0













t) − ut (ct)] ≥−(b0 · e)u
0
0
Therefore, if the market prices agree with the fundamental values ft,t h a ti sb0 =0 , we obtain the
desired property of optimality.
Proof of Theorem 2. It follows the same line of the proof of Lemma 4.1 in [11] and therefore
we shall only sketch it. Consider the asset holding strategy y1 deﬁned by y1
0 =eand y1
t =e− εv
23for t ≥ 1,w h e r ev is a ﬁxed vector in Rk
++ and ε satisﬁes the condition 0 < εv ≤ (1 − ζ)e,b e i n g
ζ deﬁned in (12). Let c1 be the corresponding consumption stream. Now, for α ∈ (0,1),d e ﬁne the
plan yα =( 1 − α)e+αy1 w i t ht h er e l a t i v ec o n s u m p t i o n scα =( 1 − α)c∗ + αc.B yc o n c a v i t y ,
α−1 [ut (c∗
t) − ut(cα









t,f r o mt ≥ 1 on, sums are increasing and, by taking the limit as N →∞and then





t) − ut (cα











where the ﬁrst is due to optimality of plan c∗ (see (iii)o fD e ﬁnition 1), whilst the second is valid
by (12). As α ↓ 0, the functions above increase, therefore, through repeated applications of the











In view of (6), (23) yields p0 = f0, and the proof is complete because, from (9), b0 =0implies bt =0
for all t.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .It is a straightforward variant of Theorem 2. It will suﬃce to consider
the assets holding strategy yi deﬁned by yi
0 =eand yi
t =e−εei for t ≥ 1,w h e r eε > 0 is suﬃciently
small and ei is the vector having zero components but the ith, which equals one. The corresponding






t for t ≥ 1. Remaining steps closely
follows those of the preceding proof.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 .Suppose there is some bubble when the initial assets supply is y0 =v∈
Rk






t (dt · v+wt)dt < +∞








t(ζdt · v+wt)dt < +∞
which is the suﬃcient condition (12) for the equilibrium with initial asset holding v to be unique.






t(dt · v + wt)dt < +∞






t(ξdt · v + wt)dt < +∞






t (ζdt · v+wt)dt < +∞
must hold. But this contradicts the assumption that some bubble occur for y0 =v . Clearly, a similar
line of reasoning applies for a perturbation of the dividends dt.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let us utilize suﬃcient condition (13) formulated in Corollary 1. We
ﬁrst observe that if there is a constant M(ζ), independent of t,s u c ht h a t
u
0
t (ζc + h) ≤ M(ζ)u
0
t(c + h) (24)
for some ζ < 1 and for all c ≥ 0, h ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, then (11) implies (13). In force of (15), the function
u
0
t (c + h)cR is non-decreasing, as can be checked by calculating its derivative. Thus u
0
t (ζc + h)ζR ≤
u
0
t (c + h) for ζ ≤ 1, and (24) is valid by setting M(ζ)=ζ−R.
Proof of Proposition 4. Denote by yt+1 ≡ y
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st¢













t) − ut (ct)] =
PN
t=1 2−t [vt (1) − vt (yt)]+
PN
t=0 2−tβtpt (yt+1 − yt)
(25)
The proof will be accomplished by considering strategies yt separately in the two following exhaustive
classes: a) limsupt→∞ yt ≥ 1;b )limsupt→∞ yt < 1.
By means of the inequality
vt(1) − vt (yt) ≥ v0
t (1)(1 − yt)




t (1) − 2−1βpt
¤
(yt − 1)
+2−NβNpN (yN+1 − 1)=2 −NβNpN (yN+1 − 1)
25where equality holds thanks to (18). Since 2−NβNpN → b0 ≥ 0,i nt h ec a s e( a )
limsup
N→∞
2−NβNpN (yN+1 − 1) ≥ 0
and our claim is proven. Consider now case (b). Taking limits in (25), we get
∞ X
t=1
2−t[vt (1) − vt (yt)] −
∞ X
t=0
2−tβtpt (yt − yt+1)
provided that the two series make sense. The ﬁrst series diverges. In fact, it turns out to be
deﬁnitively yt ≤ ζ for some ζ < 1 and the series diverges by virtue of (17). Thus, our claim will be
true provided that the second series does not diverge. On the other hand,
P∞
t=0 2−tβtpt (yt − yt+1)=
P∞
t=0 2−tβtpt (1 − yt+1) −
P∞














t (1) < ∞
where the third equality uses (18), and the desired result is proven.












to be µ-negligible for all t. Arguing by contradiction, suppose that µ(As) > 0 for some s. Then,











s + ps · [(e − ζσsei) − e] < 0
ª
(26)
where ei denote the Rk vector with all null entries but the ith equals 1.
We now construct a plan {e ct, e yt} as follows: {e ct, e yt} = {c∗
t,e} for all ω ∈ Ω,i ft<sand for



















+ ps · [(e − ζσsei) − e] ≤ c∗
s = ds · e+ws and
c∗
t − ζσsdi
t + pt · 0=dt · (e − ζσsei)+wt for t ≥ s + 1.








1As [ut (e ct) − ut (c∗
t)]





E0 [ut(e ct) − ut (c∗
t)] > 0
which contradicts weak optimality of plan {c∗
t,e}. Concluding, µ(At)=0 , for all t and, consequently,
di
t/pi
t ≥ σt for almost all ω ∈ Ω. This implies our assert.
To prove Theorem 5, some more notation and one preliminary lemma are required. Let us
introduce the scalar sequence b yi












and where the initial condition b yi







Lemma 2 Let {pt,a t} be two F-adapted processes satisfying (19). Given the sequence b yi
t deﬁned
above, if we agree upon setting pi
tb yi
t+1 =0over Pi
t, then the process atpi
tb yi























































as was to be shown.
Proof of Theorem 5. We shall extend the sequence b yi
t+1,d e ﬁn e di n( 2 7 ) ,b ys e t t i n gb yi
t+1 = ∞
over Pi
t. Clearly, b yi




























that holds for all sequences of scalars αt ≥ 0 and all N ≥ 1, from (21) it follows that the sequence
b yi
t →∞uniformly.


























¢c.S i n c e t h e s e q u e n c e b yi
t diverges uniformly, for any N we can ﬁnd a time T so that
b yi



























→ 0 as t →∞ .N o w ,i nv i e wo f( 2 0 ) ,w e
can infer that the bubble component relative to the selected state-prices vanishes.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .Let us focus on a single asset. If prices pi
t eventually vanish, nothing
is to be proved. Hence set pi




























Therefore, the deterministic increasing sequence b yi
t,d e ﬁn e di n( 2 7 )i sb o u n d e db yeMb yi
0.S o ,i f w e
take b yi
0 <e −M,w es h a l lh a v eb yi
t < 1 for all t. We claim that this leads to a contradiction. It suﬃces
constructing the following plan. If ei denotes the vector having zero components but the ith equal
to one, then let
e yt =e− gtb yi
tei
where g0 =0and gt = 1 for all t ≥ 1. It is feasible because e yt > 0 and ﬁnances consumptions
e ct = c∗
t +( gt+1 − gt)pi
tb yi
t+1
Clearly e c0 = c∗
0 + pi
0b yi
1, while e ct = c∗
t for all t ≥ 1. This contradicts the optimality of c∗
t.
References
[1] T. Bewley, The Optimum Quantity of Money, in ”Models of Monetary Economies” (J. Kareken
and N. Wallace, Eds.), Federal Reserve Bank, Minneapolis, 1980.
28[2] O. J. Blanchard and S. Fisher, ”Lectures on Macroeconomics”, Cambridge MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, 1989.
[3] W. A. Brock, On Existence of Weakly Maximal Programmes in a Multi-Sector Economy, Rev.
Econ. Stud. 37 (1970), 275-280.
[4] W. A. Brock, Asset Prices in Production Economy, in ”The Economics of Information and
Uncertainty”, (J. McCall, Ed.), 1-43, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982.
[5] D. Cass, On Capital Overaccumulation in the Aggregative Model of Economic Growth: A
complete Characterization, J. Econ. Theory 4 (1972), 200-223.
[6] D. Duﬃe, ”Security Markets”, Academic Press, New York, 1988.
[7] I. Ekeland and J. A. Scheinkman, Transversality Conditions for Some Inﬁnite Horizon Discrete
Time Optimization Problems, Math. Oper. Res. 11 (1986), 216-229.
[8] L. G. Epstein and T. Wang, Intertemporal Asset Pricing Under Knightian Uncertainty, Econo-
metrica 62 (1994), 283-322.
[9] C. Gilles and S. F. LeRoy, Bubbles and Charges, Int. Econ. Rev. 33 (1992), 323-339.
[10] K. X. D. Huang and J. Werner, ”Valuation Bubbles and Sequential Bubbles”, Department of
Economics, University of Minnesota, 1997.
[11] T. Kamihigashi, Uniqueness of Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy with Unbounded Utility,
Econ. Theory 12 (1998), 103-122.
[12] T. Kamihigashi, ”Necessity of Transversality Conditions for Inﬁnite-Horizon Problems”, De-
partment of Economics, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1999.
[13] M. Kandori, Equivalent Equilibria, Int. Econ. Rev. 29 (1988), 401-417.
[14] N. R. Kocherlakota, Bubbles and Constraints on Debt Accumulation, J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992),
245-256.
[15] R. Lucas, Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy, Econometrica 46 (1978), 1429-1445.
[16] M. Magil and M. Quinzii, Incomplete Markets over an Inﬁnite Horizon: Long-lived Securities
and Speculative Bubbles, J. Math Econ. 26 (1996), 133-170.
29[17] L. Montrucchio and F. Privileggi, On Fragility of Bubbles in Equilibrium Asset Pricing Models
of Lucas-Type, Working Paper of the Dept. of Public Policy and Collective Choice ”Polis” 5,
Alessandria, Italy (1999).
[18] M. S. Santos and M. Woodford, Rational Asset Pricing Bubbles, Econometrica 65 (1997), 19-57.
[19] J..A. Scheinkman, ”Notes on Asset Pricing”, University of Chicago, 1977.
[20] K. Shell, Notes on the Economics of Inﬁnity, J. Polit. Econ. 79 (1971), 1002-1011.
[21] S. I. Takekuma, Optimal Growth under Uncertainty: a Complete Characterization of Weakly
Maximal Programs, Hitotsubashi J. Econ. 33 (1992), 169-182.
[22] J. Tirole, On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectation, Econometrica 50
(1982), 1163-1181.
[23] C. A. Wilson, Equilibrium in Dynamic Models with an Inﬁnity of Agents, J. Econ. Theory 24
(1981), 95-111.
[24] I. Zilcha, Characterization by Prices of Optimal Programs under Uncertainty, J. Math. Econ. 3
(1976), 173-183.
30INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Luigi Montrucchio and Fabio Privileggi
ON FRAGILITY OF BUBBLES IN EQUILIBRIUM ASSET PRICING
MODELS OF LUCAS-TYPE
Working Paper no. 5/2001
April 2001
APPLIED MATHEMATICS
WORKING PAPER SERIES